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WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS. By Abigail M.
Themstrom.t A Twentieth Century Fund Study. Cambridge,
Ma.: Harvard University Press. 1987. Pp. xii, 316. $25.00.
PhilipP. Frlckey2

For a host of reasons, some identifiable and others elusive, voting rights appear to differ fundamentally from other civil rights.
Normatively, Americans somehow sense that voting is a basic right
of citizenship. Moreover, our democratic ethos (and perhaps mythos) suggests that voting is a powerful, yet highly legitimate, instrument of social change. In particular, if those citizens who have
been traditionally excluded from power have a fair opportunity to
vote, so the theory goes, they can effectively yet peacefully force our
representative institutions to undo the present effects of past discrimination to the extent consistent with other important societal
interests. The concrete civil rights reforms that result may please
no one completely, but the process by which they come about legitimates them nonetheless. This basic distinction between fair process
and fair outcome, rooted in much conventional American public
law theory,J is perhaps clearest of all in our attitude toward voting
rights.
After judicial efforts failed to undo a century of voting discrimination in the South, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of
1965. That statute applied two stringent remedies to certain portions of the country-in effect, major regions of the South-where
voting discrimination had been rampant. First, it outlawed certain
barriers preventing minorities from registering to vote, such as the
literacy test. Second, it forbade a covered jurisdiction from changl. Senior Research Associate at the Gordon Public Policy Center, Brandeis University, and former Lecturer on Social Studies at Harvard University.
2. Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. The author thanks James
Blacksher, Daniel Farber, and Gerald Torres for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of
this review.
3. The obvious citation is probably J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). Consider also the "principle of institutional settlement" at the core of the approach found in H.
HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 4-5 (tent. ed. 1958):
Implicit in every such system of procedures is the central idea of law-an idea
which can be described as the principle of institutional settlement . . . . The alternative to disintegrating resort to violence is the establishment of regularized and
peaceable means of decision. The principle of institutional settlement expresses the
judgment that decisions which are the duly arrived at as a result of duly established
procedures for making decisions of this kind ought to be accepted as binding on the
whole society unless and until they are duly changed.
Needless to say, the form/substance dichotomy is controversial in public law scholarship.
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ing "any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure with respect to voting" unless it obtained
preclearance from either the Department of Justice or the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia. Preclearance
was available only if the jurisdiction proved that the electoral
change had neither the purpose nor the effect of "denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." Congress originally gave the Act only a five-year lifespan, but it reenacted the
statute in 1970, 1975, and 1982.
Although the Voting Rights Act remains a vital component of
American civil rights law, it has received relatively little careful
scrutiny from scholars and journalists. In large part, this lack of
attention may reflect the overriding American complacency about
voting rights. Although the dissecting of sacred cows is a familiar
type of scholarly endeavor, perhaps voting rights are so central to
our civil religion as to be immune to skeptical inquiry.
Abigail M. Thernstrom has now gone where others have
largely feared to tread. Her well-researched, thoughtful, and highly
readable book presents a thoroughgoing critique of what she views
as unthinking and unjustified affirmative action in American electoral politics. She challenges conventional wisdom about enhancing
minority officeholding, yet largely avoids simplistic criticisms. That
ultimately I remained largely unmoved by her analysis perhaps suggests-aside from my own bias-simply that no single book can be
definitive in this field. At a minimum, her book calls for an equally
well-researched and thoughtful answer from those who are
unpersuaded.
In a nutshell, Thernstrom argues that the Act was designed
solely to enfranchise southern blacks. This single purpose has been
transformed over time, she contends. For one thing, congressional
amendments have brought lingual minorities as well as racial minorities within the statutory protections. Second, the courts have
applied the preclearance requirement to all changes in electoral format, not simply to methods of disenfranchisement. In addition, as
she sees it, the courts, and particularly the Department of Justice,
have interpreted the preclearance requirement as prohibiting even
the slightest electoral changes by covered jurisdictions that, while
allowing full access to the ballot for minorities, undermine-or perhaps just fail to promote-the ability of minorities to elect minority
officeholders, rather than simply candidates worthy of minority
support. Finally, in the 1982 amendments, Congress provided a nationwide judicial remedy when electoral structures that have not
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been modified since 1964 (and thus have not faced preclearance)
have a discriminatory effect upon minority voting strength.
These developments, Thernstrom argues, have turned the Voting Rights Act from a method of enfranchisement into an entitlement of meaningful minority voting power, measured by the
minority's ability to elect candidates of its own race. As such, she
concludes, the statute unduly fractures American politics along racial lines. This exacerbation of racial conflict is all the more objectionable, in her view, because the institution ultimately responsible
for it-Congress--has never clearly understood or carefully debated the utility of affirmative action in electoral politics. "The
right to vote no longer means simply the right to enter a polling
booth and pull the lever. Yet the issue retains a simple Fifteenth
Amendment aura-an aura that is pure camouflage."
I do not wish to overstate Thernstrom's argument. She is sensitive to the lingering problems of voting discrimination. She recognizes that in some contexts all-white legislative bodies are subject to
question. In her final chapter, in what I found to be her most perceptive discussion, she acknowledges that in many rural southern
areas blacks continue to be shut out of electoral politics, and that
intrusive relief under the Voting Rights Act is justifiable in those
circumstances. In short, she wields a scalpel, not a cleaver.
Although Thernstrom proposes important changes in the interpretation of the Voting Rights Act, she would not eviscerate it. She
would construe the preclearance requirement as prohibiting jurisdictions from backsliding on minority voter influence. In her view,
the 1982 amendment providing nationwide protection against discriminatory electoral systems should outlaw situations in which the
minority community is truly frozen out of the political process.
Both of these conclusions are outgrowths of her attempt to respect
congressional intent and to limit federal intrusion into local political
affairs.
I cannot attempt in this space to present a detailed answer to
her analysis. I think she exaggerates when she asserts that the only
purpose of the original Voting Rights Act was to enable minorities
to cast votes. Moreover, she fails to perceive that statutes, especially civil rights statutes, should have some room to grow as society adapts to them. For example, the employment discrimination
prohibition of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had, by
1979, evolved so that it did not bar all affirmative action efforts to
promote minority employment.4 Title VII gradually changed hue
4.

See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). Statutory evolution in gen·
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without much intermediate congressional reconsideration of the
statute. In contrast, the Voting Rights Act has been reenacted, and
strengthened, three times in its twenty-three year life. From a formalistic standpoint, at least, the evolving nature of the Voting
Rights Act seems unobjectionable.
It is true, I think, that since 1965 Congress as a whole has not
carefully deliberated all sides of the issues Thernstrom has raised.
It is also true that the civil rights lobby has powerful muscles to flex
on the voting rights question and that opponents have proved to be
weak and disorganized. Although careful legislative deliberation
insulated from lobbying pressures would seem to be the Madisonian
ideal, I, for one, find its absence less troubling when those historically disadvantaged end up prevailing. I would not join, without
strong evidence, Thernstrom's speculation that civil rights lobbyists
may be wrong about what is best for minorities.
At times, Thernstrom's style is rather aloof and bloodless. For
example, throughout most of the book she treats Mobile v. Bolden,s
a principal constitutional voting rights case, as an abstract legal
problem; only in her final chapter does she present some careful and
sensitive insights into the nature of race and politics in Mobile,
Alabama.
A more general example of perhaps undue abstraction is her
treatment of at-large elections. If there is racial bloc voting and
blacks constitute a minority in a city, blacks cannot elect any candidate of their choice to a city council elected at-large; if the minority
community is geographically concentrated, in contrast, a wardelection format may well result in the election of one or more candidates supported by the minority community. At-large elections are
thus suspect under the Voting Rights Act in some circumstances.
Thernstrom counters: "Where white candidates (as well as black
and Hispanic) actively seek minority votes and those votes often
influence the outcome of every electoral contest, at-large elections
may provide fewer [minority] seats but more influence-and by that
token more representation." That seems undisputably true, but
how relevant is it? Thernstrom frankly admits optimism about
whites being willing to vote for black candidates, and about candidates ordinarily profiting from courting minority voters despite potential white voter backlash. Indeed, she tells the reader that
"[t]oday there remain almost no jurisdictions in which the preferred
candidates of minority voters experience white harassment." To
era!, and the evolution of Title VII in particular, are discussed in Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987).

5.
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her credit, she admits that some will disagree with her sociological
generalizations. Where one stands on issues like this, she rightly
notes, "determines one's judgment on every concrete issue involving
minority voting rights." Unfortunately, Themstrom does not-in
fairness, probably cannot-demonstrate the accuracy of her generalizations in contrast to those of less sanguine observers.6
Two jarring, although probably minor, errors in her book exacerbated my sense that Themstrom sometimes lacked a full measure
of the voting rights situation. She quotes with approval language
from a Fifth Circuit voting rights decision and attributes it to
"Judge Leon Higginbotham." She means Patrick Higginbotham, of
course, the thoughtful, conservative-and white-Fifth Circuit
judge, not Leon Higginbotham, the thoughtful, liberal-and
black-Third Circuit judge. In a footnote, she misidentifies Judge
John Minor Wisdom, a pillar of liberal voting rights jurisprudence
even in the bad old days in the South, as "Judge Minor Wisdom."
Unfortunately, this will remind readers with long memories of the
taunting misnomers once applied to Judge Wisdom by those opposed to basic civil rights for southern blacks-names like "Judge
Major Ignorance" and "Judge John Minus Wisdom." These errors
were no doubt inadvertent, and one trusts they will be corrected in
later printings.
In the last analysis, Themstrom presents a plausible argument
that the Voting Rights Act, as interpreted, unduly burdens the
"melting pot" phenomenon that, she assumes, characterizes most
American politics today, including local politics. She may well be
correct. I have always been skeptical of that melting pot, however,
for it seems to be an invitation to minorities to jump into the pot at
the risk of losing what is unique about them. It may well be that
America has advanced so far that the dominant society is now, by
and large, asking minorities to join it. It might just be, though, that
"they" would just as soon not be homogenized to the point of becoming interchangeable with "us." Moreover, it just might be that
minority self-determination will, in the long run, enrich society
more than any simple homogenization could ever do. Self-determination and empowerment may simply be valuable in themselves.
On these matters too, as Thernstrom recognizes, where one stands
will determine how one ultimately evaluates concrete voting rights
6. Her discussion of the question of at-large elections would have been rendered less
abstract, and more complete, by a consideration ofP. HEILIG & R. MUNDT, YouR VOICE AT
CITY HALL (1984), which presents a balanced empirical perspective on the utility of at-large
elections.
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problems, and more generally whether one condemns or praises the
fostering of minority officeholding under the Voting Rights Act.
Getting beyond racism, as Justice Blackmun recognized in his
concurrence in Bakke, may require consideration of race in the context of group as well as individual rights. Does the Voting Rights
Act, by balkanizing the races in electoral politics, frustrate progress
toward the elimination of racism? Or does the Act, by helping empower minorities, promise to contribute to the eventual eradication
of racism? In part, at least, these questions turn on short-term versus long-term perspectives. Thernstrom and those who dissent
from her views may agree on ultimate ends, but disagree on the
means and the time frame involved. Her book is a major contribution that should foster clearer thinking and more careful analysis of
these important issues.

ARE WE TO BE A NATION? THE MAKING OF THE
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THE ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. By Robert Shnayerson.3 New York, N.Y.: Harry N. Abrams, Inc., Publishers,
in Association with The Supreme Court Historical Society.
1987. Pp. 303. $60.00.
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In the clutter of patriotic and commemorative events that have
dominated (and will likely continue to dominate) this Bicentennial,
we might well pause to reflect on the sage advice that the mayor of
Salina, Kansas gave when asked some years ago how best to celebrate the Declaration of Independence. "[C]ome up with [something]," he pleaded, "that somebody will give a damn about in 50
years."s Much of what has transpired so far will probably fail the
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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